

Question 2:

(2) Consumer in country i

$$\text{Max } U_i = [T_{ii}^p + T_{ij}^p]^{\frac{p}{1-p}} \cdot N_i^{1-p}$$

F.O.Cs

$$T_{ii}: \frac{\theta}{p} [T_{ii}^p + T_{ij}^p]^{\frac{\theta}{p}-1} \cdot p T_{ii}^{p-1} \cdot N_i^{1-p} = \lambda_i \cdot p_{ii}^T$$

$$T_{ij}: \frac{\theta}{p} [T_{ii}^p + T_{ij}^p]^{\frac{\theta}{p}-1} \cdot p T_{ij}^{p-1} \cdot N_i^{1-p} = \lambda_i p_{ij}^T$$

$$N_i: (1-p) [T_{ii}^p + T_{ij}^p]^{\frac{\theta}{p}} \cdot N_i^{-p} = \lambda_i p_i^N$$

Then using the first two

$$\left(\frac{T_{ij}}{T_{ii}}\right)^{p-1} = \frac{p_{ij}^T}{p_{ii}^T} = \frac{(1+\tau_{ij}) p_j^T}{p_i^T}$$

$$\Rightarrow \left(\frac{(1+\tau_{ij}) p_j^T T_{ij}}{p_i^T T_{ii}}\right)^{p-1} \cdot \frac{(p_i^T)^{p-1}}{(1+\tau_{ij}) p_j^T} = \frac{(1+\tau_{ij}) p_j^T}{p_i^T}$$

$$\text{Let } X_{ij} = (1+\tau_{ij}) p_j^T T_{ij}$$

$$X_{ii} = p_i^T \cdot T_{ii}$$

$$\therefore \left(\frac{X_{ij}}{X_{ii}}\right)^{p-1} = \frac{(1+\tau_{ij})^p \cdot (p_j^T)^p}{(p_i^T)^p}$$

$$\Rightarrow \left(\frac{X_{ii}}{X_{ij}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-p}} = \frac{(1+\tau_{ij})^p \cdot (p_j^T)^p}{(p_i^T)^p} = (1+\tau_{ij})^p \cdot \frac{(w_j/\alpha_j)^p}{(w_i/\alpha_i)^p}$$

Interpret
this equation

$$\log\left(\frac{X_{ii}}{X_{ij}}\right) = \frac{p}{1-p} \log\left(\frac{w_i}{w_j}\right) + \frac{p}{1-p} \log\left(\frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_j}\right) + \frac{p}{1-p} \log(1+\tau_{ij})$$

What is the elasticity of ~~the~~ relative trade volume w.r.t $(1+\tau_{ij})$

$$\frac{\partial \log(X_{ii}/X_{ij})}{\partial \log(1+\tau_{ij})} = \frac{p}{1-p}$$

From the consumer's F.O.C.s

~~$$\frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \cdot \frac{N_i}{[T_{ii} + T_{ij}]} \cdot \frac{1}{T_{ii}^{1-\theta}} = \frac{p_i^T}{p_i^N}$$~~

~~$$\Rightarrow \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \cdot \frac{N_i}{T_{ii}} \cdot \frac{1}{\left[1 + \left(\frac{T_{ij}}{T_{ii}}\right)^\theta\right]} = \frac{p_i^T}{p_i^N}$$~~

Similarly

~~$$\frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \cdot \frac{N_i}{T_{ij}} \cdot \frac{1}{\left[\left(\frac{T_{ii}}{T_{ij}}\right)^\theta + 1\right]} = \frac{(1+\tau_{ij})p_j^T}{p_i^N}$$~~

Adding the two equations implies

~~$$\frac{\theta}{1-\theta} N_i \left[\frac{1}{T_{ii}^{1-\theta} [T_{ii} + T_{ij}]} + \frac{1}{T_{ij}^{1-\theta} [T_{ii} + T_{ij}]} \right] = \frac{1}{p_i^N} [p_i^T + (1+\tau_{ij})p_j^T]$$~~

~~$$\frac{\theta}{1-\theta} N_i$$~~

(3) Note that $p_i^N \cdot N_i = (1-\theta) W_i$

By market clearing $N_i = Y_i^N$

$$\Rightarrow p_i^N Y_i^N = (1-\theta) W_i$$

Since firms use a CRS technology \Rightarrow profits are zero

$$\Rightarrow W_i \cdot L_i^N = (1-\theta) W_i$$

$$\therefore L_i^N = (1-\theta)$$

Since $L_i^T + L_i^N = 1$

$$\Rightarrow L_i^T = \theta$$

Note that

$$p_i^T \cdot T_{ii} + p_j^T (1+\tau_{ij}) T_{ij} = \theta \cdot W_i$$

Since $X_{ii} = \left[(1+\tau_{ij}) \left(\frac{p_j^T}{p_i^T} \right)^\theta \right]^{1-\theta} \cdot X_{ij}$

$$\Rightarrow \left[(1+\tau_{ij}) \frac{p_j^T}{p_i^T} \right]^{1/(1-p)} X_{ij} + X_{ij} = \theta w_i$$

$$\Rightarrow X_{ij} = \frac{\theta w_i}{\left[(1+\tau_{ij}) \frac{p_j^T}{p_i^T} \right]^{1/(1-p)} + 1}$$

Similarly $X_{ji} = \frac{\theta w_j}{\left[(1+\tau_{ji}) \frac{p_i^T}{p_j^T} \right]^{1/(1-p)} + 1}$

Since trade is balanced $X_{ij} = X_{ji}$

$$\frac{\theta w_i}{\left[(1+\tau_{ij}) \frac{p_j^T}{p_i^T} \right]^{1/(1-p)} + 1} = \frac{\theta w_j}{\left[(1+\tau_{ji}) \frac{p_i^T}{p_j^T} \right]^{1/(1-p)} + 1}$$

Let $i=h$ & $j=f$, and assume $w_h=1$

$$\Rightarrow \left[(1+\tau_{ji}) \frac{p_i^T}{p_j^T} \right]^{1/(1-p)} + 1 = w_j \left\{ \left[(1+\tau_{ij}) \frac{p_j^T}{p_i^T} \right]^{1/(1-p)} + 1 \right\}$$

$$\Rightarrow (1+\tau_{jh})^{1/(1-p)} \cdot \frac{(w_h/k_h)^{1/(1-p)}}{(w_f/d_f)^{1/(1-p)}} + 1 = w_f (1+\tau_{hf})^{1/(1-p)} \cdot \frac{(w_f/d_f)^{1/(1-p)}}{(w_h/d_h)^{1/(1-p)}} + w_f$$

$$\Rightarrow (1+\tau_{jh})^{1/(1-p)} \cdot \left(\frac{k_f}{d_h} \right)^{1/(1-p)} \cdot w_f^{1/(1-p)} + 1 = (1+\tau_{hf})^{1/(1-p)} \cdot \left(\frac{d_f}{d_h} \right)^{1/(1-p)} \cdot w_f^{1/(1-p)} + w_f$$

$$\Rightarrow \left[(1+\tau_{jh})^{1/(1-p)} \cdot \left(\frac{d_f}{d_h} \right)^{1/(1-p)} + w_f \right]^{1/(1-p)} = \left[(1+\tau_{hf})^{1/(1-p)} \cdot \left(\frac{d_f}{d_h} \right)^{1/(1-p)} \cdot w_f^{1/(1-p)} + w_f \right]^{1/(1-p)}$$

(4) Since the rich country's θ decreases from 0.5 to 0.25 it allocates a smaller fraction of its income on tradables. This will reduce the volume of trade, and hence reduce the gains from trade

(1) $\text{Max}_{\{L_i^T\}} p_i^T Y_i^T - w_i L_i^T$
 s.t. $Y_i^T = d_i L_i^T$

$\text{Max}_{\{L_i^N\}} p_i^N Y_i^N - w_i L_i^N$
 s.t. $Y_i^N = \beta_i L_i^N$

F.O.C
 $L_i^T: p_i^T d_i - w_i = 0 \Rightarrow p_i^T = \frac{w_i}{d_i}$

F.O.C
 $L_i^N: p_i^N \beta_i - w_i = 0 \Rightarrow p_i^N = \frac{w_i}{\beta_i}$

Terms-of-Trade: $\frac{\text{Price of Exports}}{\text{Price of Imports}} = \frac{p_i}{(1+\tau_{ij}) p_j^T} = \frac{w_i}{w_j} \cdot \frac{\alpha_j}{d_i} \cdot \frac{1}{(1+\tau_{ij})}$